This article is part of a comprehensive series covering the punitive articles of the UCMJ (Uniform Code of Military Justice). It is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Service members facing any UCMJ charge should consult a qualified military defense attorney.
Every state in the United States has a hit-and-run statute. The UCMJ has one too, codified at 10 U.S.C. § 911. But Article 111 carries a critical addition that civilian law doesn’t include: it can charge passengers as well as drivers. Not any passengers. Senior passengers, the ones whose rank creates a legal duty to ensure the driver does the right thing.
The article is a product of the MJA 2016 restructuring. Before January 1, 2019, leaving the scene of an accident was prosecuted under Article 134’s general clauses as conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline. The MJA gave it standalone status, specific elements, and a codified passenger-liability provision that formalized what military practice had long recognized: rank carries accountability even from the passenger seat.
Driver Obligations and Elements
The primary offense under Article 111 covers the operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in personal injury or property damage. The MCM 2024 (Part IV, Paragraph 63) sets out four elements for the driver offense: the accused was the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident, the accident resulted in personal injury or property damage, the accused knew or had reason to know the accident had occurred, and the accused left the scene without providing assistance to an injured person or providing personal identification to others involved or to appropriate authorities.
The knowledge element is where most litigation concentrates. A driver who genuinely doesn’t realize a collision occurred hasn’t committed the offense. But “reason to know” sets a lower bar than actual knowledge. If a reasonable person under the circumstances would have recognized the collision happened, felt the impact, heard the sound, noticed the damage, the element is satisfied. Prosecution frequently establishes this through physical evidence: the severity of the impact, damage visible on the accused’s vehicle, witness testimony about the collision’s force.
“Property damage” is interpreted broadly under the MCM. No significant damage threshold applies. A minor fender contact that leaves a mark is technically sufficient. In practice, any contact event followed by departure creates Article 111 exposure. The prosecution does not need to prove the accused caused the accident, only that the accused was the driver of a vehicle involved in one.
The obligation to provide identification or assistance is in the alternative: the accused must have failed to do at least one. Providing identification but ignoring an injured person, or stopping to help but refusing to identify yourself, each satisfies the element. The statute contemplates both the coward who flees to avoid consequences and the person who panics and drives away despite no ill intent.
Senior Passenger Liability
This is where Article 111 diverges most sharply from civilian hit-and-run statutes. A separate offense, with its own elements under MCM 2024 (Part IV, Paragraph 63), applies to passengers who meet three criteria: they were a passenger in a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in personal injury or property damage, they were the superior commissioned or noncommissioned officer of the driver or the commander of the vehicle, and they wrongfully and unlawfully ordered, caused, or permitted the driver to leave the scene.
“Ordered” is straightforward: the senior passenger told the driver to leave. “Caused” covers indirect direction, applying pressure, manipulating the situation, creating circumstances where leaving was the expected outcome. “Permitted” is the broadest and most significant verb. It imposes an affirmative duty on the senior service member. A staff sergeant riding with a private who starts to drive away from an accident scene must intervene. Silence is permission. Doing nothing while the driver flees is itself the offense.
This provision reflects the military’s expectation that rank carries a duty to ensure compliance with legal obligations, not just a privilege of being driven around. The parallel to command responsibility under Article 77 (Principals) is direct: a person who permits a criminal act, having the authority and duty to prevent it, bears independent liability.
The defense available to senior passengers is limited but real. If the passenger had no practical ability to stop the driver, if the driver accelerated before the passenger could speak or act, the “permitted” element may fail. But the burden falls on the defense to establish that impossibility. A senior NCO who sat silently while the driver made a deliberate choice to leave will have difficulty arguing they couldn’t have intervened.
Practical Overlap and Charging Decisions
Article 111 cases frequently accompany other charges. A service member who drives drunk, hits a parked car, and leaves the scene faces Article 113 (Drunken or Reckless Operation) and Article 111 simultaneously. A drunk-driving accident where the service member flees and someone is injured can stack Article 113, Article 111, and potentially Article 128 (Assault) if the driving itself constituted culpable negligence causing injury.
The leaving is often the more damaging charge practically. It demonstrates consciousness of guilt and eliminates any opportunity for the accused to argue the collision wasn’t their fault. Prosecutors understand this dynamic. A service member who stays at the scene, cooperates with investigation, and takes responsibility may face only the underlying traffic offense. The one who flees faces the underlying offense plus Article 111, and the flight itself becomes evidence of culpable mental state for the other charges.
Article 111 also interacts with installation jurisdiction. Vehicle accidents on military installations fall within court-martial jurisdiction automatically. Off-installation accidents involving service members may be prosecuted under both the UCMJ and civilian law, depending on the Status of Forces Agreement (overseas) or the Assimilative Crimes Act (domestic installations). The Memoranda of Understanding between installations and local law enforcement often determine which system takes the lead.
Maximum punishment for both the driver and senior passenger offenses: bad-conduct discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and six months’ confinement. The relatively low maximum reflects the nature of the offense, it’s about fleeing accountability, not about the underlying conduct that caused the accident. But the collateral consequences are significant: a bad-conduct discharge affects VA benefits, future employment, and the characterization of an entire career of service.
Article 111 applies the military’s core accountability principle to vehicle accidents: when something goes wrong, you don’t leave. You stop, you identify yourself, you deal with the consequences. The article’s extension to senior passengers reinforces that this accountability isn’t just personal, it travels with rank. A senior service member who allows a subordinate to flee an accident scene has failed a duty that the UCMJ treats as inseparable from the authority they carry.
Joseph L. Jordan, Attorney at Law: Article 111 is the UCMJ’s hit-and-run statute, but with a critical addition civilian law lacks: it can charge senior passengers as well as drivers. The driver offense requires knowledge or reason to know an accident occurred, and failure to provide assistance or identification.
This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. No attorney-client relationship is created by reading this content. If you are facing charges under the UCMJ or need legal guidance regarding military justice matters, consult a qualified military defense attorney.