This article is part of a comprehensive series covering the punitive articles of the UCMJ (Uniform Code of Military Justice). It is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Service members facing any UCMJ charge should consult a qualified military defense attorney.
Most UCMJ punitive articles regulate what subordinates do to superiors, disrespect, disobedience, assault, desertion. Article 93 reverses the direction. It regulates what superiors do to subordinates, criminalizing the abuse of the authority that other articles exist to protect.
That reversal makes Article 93 (10 U.S.C. § 893) structurally different from the provisions that surround it. Articles 89 through 92 assume the threat comes from below, from the service member who defies, disrespects, or disobeys. Article 93 assumes the threat comes from above, from the leader who uses their position to inflict harm on those required to follow their orders. The existence of both sets of protections reflects a basic principle of military justice: authority must be enforceable, but it must also be accountable.
What the Statute Requires
The statutory text is one sentence: “Any person subject to this chapter who is guilty of cruelty toward, or oppression or maltreatment of, any person subject to his orders shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.” The MCM 2024 (Part IV, Paragraph 18) sets out the elements: the accused maltreated a person subject to the accused’s orders, and the maltreatment was cruel, oppressive, or otherwise violated the standard.
The MCM distills this into two elements. First, a certain person was subject to the orders of the accused. Second, the accused was cruel toward, oppressed, or maltreated that person.
Both elements carry more complexity than they initially suggest.
“Subject to the orders of the accused” does not mean only direct subordinates in the formal chain of command. It includes anyone who, because of some duty, is required to obey the accused’s lawful orders. Drill sergeant trainees fall under this authority. Charge of quarters personnel under a duty NCO qualify. Medical staff under a hospital commander qualify. What matters is function, not just position. It depends on whether authority exists, not on whether the accused and victim share a unit or a direct reporting line.
“Cruelty, oppression, or maltreatment” is measured by an objective standard. Proof of subjective harm to the victim is not required. It needs to prove that the accused’s conduct, judged by the standard of a reasonable person familiar with military norms, constituted cruelty, oppression, or maltreatment. The CAAF addressed this in United States v. Carson, 57 M.J. 410 (2002), and subsequent cases have consistently applied the objective test.
What Counts, and What Doesn’t
The MCM specifies that Article 93 encompasses assault, improper punishment, and sexual harassment. But the statute is broader than those examples. Courts have found Article 93 violations in verbal abuse, psychological manipulation, withholding basic necessities, retaliating against subordinates who report misconduct, assigning impossible or unreasonably dangerous tasks without operational justification, and public humiliation.
The critical distinction is between legitimate exercise of authority and abuse. Assigning hard or hazardous duties is not maltreatment if the assignment serves a valid military purpose. Running recruits until they are exhausted is exercising training authority. The same drill instructor who runs a specific recruit beyond the point of physical safety as personal punishment has crossed into Article 93 territory. Ordering extra duty as a lawful punishment under Article 15 is exercising disciplinary authority. Assigning degrading tasks with no training or operational value to a subordinate they dislike is maltreating them.
The line is not always clean. The CAAF noted in United States v. Cury, 28 M.J. 419 (C.M.A. 1989), that more than mere seniority of rank is required to implicate Article 93; the accused must have exercised some form of authority over the victim, and the conduct must exceed what a reasonable person would consider acceptable within the military context. Hard training, demanding standards, and strict discipline are not cruelty. Personal abuse disguised as discipline is.
Sexual Harassment as Maltreatment
Article 93 has become one of the primary vehicles for prosecuting sexual harassment within the military when the harasser holds authority over the victim. The MCM explicitly includes sexual harassment within the scope of maltreatment, defining it as unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature.
Two categories of sexual harassment map onto Article 93 with particular clarity. Quid pro quo harassment, conditioning professional benefits or threatening professional consequences on sexual compliance, exploits the authority relationship that Article 93 is designed to protect. Hostile environment harassment, creating a pervasive atmosphere of unwelcome sexual conduct, may constitute maltreatment when the harasser has authority over the victim and the conduct is severe enough to meet the objective standard.
The authority element is what distinguishes Article 93 sexual harassment from the same conduct charged under other provisions. When a service member sexually harasses someone over whom they have no authority, the charge is more likely to fall under Article 134 (conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline) or the specific sexual offense articles. When the harasser has authority over the victim, Article 93 captures the additional dimension of abuse of power.
The Relationship Between Article 93 and Article 93a
The Military Justice Act of 2016 created Article 93a (10 U.S.C. § 893a), which specifically addresses prohibited activities with military recruits or trainees by persons in positions of special trust. Article 93a is not a replacement for Article 93; it is a companion provision that covers a narrower and more specifically defined category of misconduct.
Article 93a targets the unique vulnerability of recruits and trainees, who occupy the most extreme power imbalance in the military: they are new, they have no institutional knowledge, they depend entirely on their trainers and drill instructors, and they often lack the awareness or confidence to report abuse. The MJA recognized that this population needed dedicated protection beyond what Article 93’s general maltreatment standard provides.
The maximum punishment for Article 93a (dishonorable discharge, total forfeiture, five years’ confinement) exceeds Article 93’s maximum (dishonorable discharge, total forfeiture, three years’ confinement). The harsher penalty reflects the aggravating factor of the trust relationship, a drill instructor who abuses a recruit has violated not only the prohibition against maltreatment but also the special duty of care that the training environment imposes.
Both articles can apply to the same facts. A drill instructor who physically abuses a recruit during training has committed maltreatment under Article 93 (cruelty toward a person subject to their orders) and may also have committed a prohibited activity under Article 93a if the conduct falls within that article’s specific definitions. The prosecution can charge under both, and the accused can be convicted under both if the elements of each are satisfied independently.
Where Article 93 Fits in the Authority Framework
Articles 88 through 92 protect authority from below. Article 93 protects people from above. Together, they form a complete circuit: the UCMJ enforces obedience and punishes defiance, but it also constrains the authority it empowers and punishes its abuse.
This two-directional design is not incidental. The framers of the UCMJ understood that a system which only demanded obedience without constraining authority would produce tyranny within the ranks. Article 93 exists because the same chain of command that Articles 89, 90, 91, and 92 protect can itself become a weapon against the people it is supposed to lead. The provision ensures that the question is always bidirectional: did the subordinate respect the authority above them, and did the authority above them deserve the protection the law provides?
The divestiture defense available under Article 89, where an officer who grossly violates standards loses their protected status, reflects this same logic from the other direction. Authority that abuses its position loses its claim to the protection the law extends.
Joseph L. Jordan, Attorney at Law: Article 93 criminalizes cruelty, oppression, or maltreatment by a superior toward any person subject to their orders. Unlike most UCMJ articles that regulate subordinate conduct toward superiors, Article 93 holds leaders accountable for abusing the authority they are given.
This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. No attorney-client relationship is created by reading this content. If you are facing charges under the UCMJ or need legal guidance regarding military justice matters, consult a qualified military defense attorney.