This article is part of a comprehensive series covering the punitive articles of the UCMJ (Uniform Code of Military Justice). It is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Service members facing any UCMJ charge should consult a qualified military defense attorney.
Mutiny is the collective refusal to obey lawful military authority with the intent to override it. Sedition is the collective creation of revolt against lawful civil authority with the intent to destroy it. Article 94 criminalizes both, along with the failure to suppress or report either one, and makes every variation punishable by death. Not just mutiny. Not just sedition. Even failing to report what you know. The UCMJ treats the entire category as existential threats to the structures that hold military and civil authority together.
Article 94 (10 U.S.C. § 894) occupies a unique position in the punitive articles. Article 94 is among the most severe provisions in the UCMJ, one of the few that authorizes the death penalty in both wartime and peacetime for every offense it covers. Prosecutions are extraordinarily rare. But rarity does not diminish the article’s significance, it reveals something about how the UCMJ uses maximum penalties as structural deterrents, not just as practical sentencing tools.
Mutiny by Violence, Mutiny by Refusal, Sedition, and Failure to Act
Article 94(a) defines three primary offenses and, through the interaction with Article 80, a fourth. The MCM 2024 (Part IV, Paragraph 19) distinguishes between mutiny with intent to usurp military authority, mutiny with intent to refuse duty, and sedition.
Mutiny by violence or disturbance
Any person who, with intent to usurp or override lawful military authority, creates violence or disturbance. This form of mutiny can be committed by a single person. The “in concert” requirement that applies to mutiny by refusal does not apply here, one service member who creates violence with the requisite intent has committed mutiny.
Mutiny by refusal
Any person who, with intent to usurp or override lawful military authority, refuses in concert with any other person to obey orders or otherwise do their duty. Such is the form most people associate with the word “mutiny”: collective disobedience. The “in concert” element requires at least two people acting together, but the refusal need not be preconceived or planned. It need not be violent. Two service members who simultaneously refuse a lawful order with the shared intent to override authority have committed mutiny even if neither planned it in advance.
Sedition
Any person who, with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of lawful civil authority, creates in concert with any other person revolt, violence, or disturbance against that authority. Sedition requires action against civil authority, not military authority, that distinction separates it from mutiny. Like refusal-based mutiny, sedition requires concert between at least two persons. Unlike mutiny, the target is the civilian government rather than the military chain of command.
Attempted mutiny
Through Article 80’s general attempt provision, a person who takes a direct step toward committing mutiny, beyond mere preparation, with the specific intent to commit the offense has committed attempted mutiny. Article 94(b) explicitly includes attempted mutiny in the death-eligible category. This means a person who tries to organize a mutiny but fails can face the same maximum punishment as a person who succeeds.
The MCM defines key terms with specificity. “Violence” means the exertion of physical force. “Disturbance” means interruption of or interference with a state of peace or order. “Usurp” means to seize and hold by force or without right. “Override” means to set aside or supersede. “Revolt” means a casting off or repudiation of allegiance. “Overthrow” means overturning, subverting, or destroying.
The Intent Element That Separates Mutiny from Disobedience
The difference between Article 94 mutiny and Article 90 or 91 disobedience is not the act, it is the intent. A service member who refuses a direct order with no broader purpose has committed willful disobedience (Article 90 or 91, depending on who gave the order). A service member who refuses the same order with the intent to usurp or override lawful military authority has committed mutiny.
Intent is what makes Article 94 a capital offense while Articles 90 and 91 are not (outside wartime). The UCMJ draws a bright line: disobedience attacks a specific order; mutiny attacks the system of authority itself. Refusing to clean your barracks because you don’t feel like it is insubordination. Refusing to clean your barracks as part of a coordinated effort to demonstrate that your unit will no longer follow your commander’s orders is mutiny.
This distinction creates both prosecutorial power and prosecutorial risk. Intent must be proven, and the standard is high. The prosecution must demonstrate that the accused did not merely disobey but intended to override or usurp the authority that issued the order. Circumstantial evidence, the coordinated nature of the refusal, statements made before or during the act, the presence of demands or conditions, typically establishes intent. But the line between collective frustration expressed through simultaneous noncompliance and genuine mutiny is one that courts examine carefully.
The Duty to Suppress and Report
Article 94(a)(3) criminalizes two forms of passive participation in mutiny or sedition. First, any person who fails to do their utmost to prevent and suppress a mutiny or sedition being committed in their presence. Second, any person who fails to take all reasonable means to inform their superior commissioned officer or commanding officer of a mutiny or sedition they know or have reason to believe is taking place.
Both offenses carry the death penalty. This is the most aggressive feature of Article 94: you do not have to participate in mutiny or sedition to face capital punishment for it. You merely have to witness it without acting, or know about it without reporting.
The “utmost” standard for suppression is demanding. It does not require success, it requires maximum effort. A single service member who encounters a mutiny involving a hundred others is not expected to physically stop them. They are expected to do everything within their power, including attempting to persuade, seeking help, and removing themselves to report. The “all reasonable means” standard for reporting is similarly demanding: it is not sufficient to tell a peer or mention it casually. The obligation is to inform a superior commissioned officer or commanding officer through whatever channels are available.
The failure-to-report provision has no intent requirement beyond knowledge. A service member need not share the mutineers’ intent or approve of their actions. They need only know or have reason to believe that mutiny or sedition is occurring and fail to report it. This imposes an affirmative duty on every service member, not just leaders, to act as a safeguard against collective threats to authority.
Note the limiting distinction: failure to report an impending mutiny or sedition, one that has not yet begun, does not fall under Article 94. It may constitute dereliction of duty under Article 92(3), but the Article 94 reporting obligation attaches only to mutiny or sedition that is actually occurring.
Why Article 94 Is Rarely Charged
Modern Article 94 prosecutions are exceptionally uncommon. The most notable recent invocation involved the January 6, 2021, events at the U.S. Capitol, where the Congressional Research Service analyzed whether service members who participated could face sedition charges under Article 94. Historical cases are similarly sparse, the 1972 prosecution of three Marines aboard the USS Sumter for mutiny at sea was described at the time as the first such charge in the Navy or Marine Corps since the Civil War.
Several factors explain the rarity. First, the intent element is difficult to prove at the Article 94 level. Most collective disobedience involves grievances about conditions, leadership, or specific policies, not the intent to override military authority as a system. Charging Article 90 or 91 disobedience, or Article 92 failure to obey, accomplishes discipline without requiring proof of the higher intent.
Second, the death penalty authorization creates procedural complexity. Capital cases under the UCMJ require a panel of at least twelve members, a unanimous finding of guilt, and a separate unanimous sentencing determination. Prosecutors who can achieve the same practical result, conviction and punishment, through a lesser article have strong incentive to avoid the procedural burden of a capital prosecution.
Third, military culture operates as a preventive mechanism. The chain of command’s layered structure, combined with the UCMJ’s graduated penalties for disobedience (Articles 90, 91, 92), catches and punishes noncompliance before it escalates to the collective, authority-threatening level that Article 94 targets. Mutiny is, in a functional sense, the failure of every other disciplinary mechanism.
The Capital Punishment Tier
Article 94 belongs to a small group of UCMJ provisions that authorize the death penalty in peacetime as well as wartime. This group includes Article 81 (conspiracy, when the underlying offense is capital), Article 99 (misbehavior before the enemy), Article 100 (subordinate compelling surrender), Article 103a (espionage), Article 103b (aiding the enemy), Article 110 (improper hazarding of vessel), and Article 118 (murder). A separate group, including Articles 85 (desertion), 90 (willful disobedience), and 95 (offenses by sentinel), authorizes capital punishment only in wartime.
Article 94’s placement in the peacetime-and-wartime capital category reflects the military’s judgment that mutiny and sedition threaten not just operational effectiveness during combat but the structural integrity of the armed forces and the civilian government at all times. A peacetime mutiny at a stateside installation is treated as fundamentally different from peacetime disobedience, not because the immediate consequences are necessarily worse, but because the intent to override authority attacks the system itself.
Joseph L. Jordan, Attorney at Law: Article 94 covers mutiny, sedition, and the failure to suppress or report either one. It is among the few UCMJ articles authorizing the death penalty in both wartime and peacetime for every offense it defines. Prosecutions are extraordinarily rare but the article functions as a structural deterrent.
This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. No attorney-client relationship is created by reading this content. If you are facing charges under the UCMJ or need legal guidance regarding military justice matters, consult a qualified military defense attorney.