This article is part of a comprehensive series covering the punitive articles of the UCMJ (Uniform Code of Military Justice). It is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Service members facing any UCMJ charge should consult a qualified military defense attorney.
Article 103b (10 U.S.C. § 903b) is the broadest loyalty offense in the UCMJ, and one of the most recently amended. When Congress amended Article 103b through the FY2025 NDAA (Pub. L. 118-159), it expanded the statute to cover scenarios that did not exist when the UCMJ was first enacted: cyber-enabled assistance, satellite communication interception, and digital transfers of operational intelligence. The amendment reflects a reality that the methods of aiding an enemy have changed faster than any other category of military offense.
The scope of what Article 103b prohibits goes well beyond passing classified documents. A service member can violate this article by handing over ammunition, providing shelter, or maintaining unauthorized correspondence with hostile forces. No transfer of information is required. Any form of material, logistical, or communicative assistance to a hostile force falls within the statute’s reach.
Material Aid and the Enemy Requirement
Article 103b defines two distinct offenses under MCM 2024 (Part IV, Paragraph 54c), both requiring the existence of an “enemy.”
The first offense: any person subject to the UCMJ who aids or attempts to aid the enemy with arms, ammunition, supplies, money, or other things. This is the material assistance provision. “Other things” is deliberately expansive, it covers anything of value to the enemy’s war effort, from vehicles and fuel to equipment and technology. The attempt is explicitly included, so a service member intercepted while transporting supplies toward enemy lines has committed the offense even if the supplies never arrived.
Second offense: any person subject to the UCMJ who, without proper authority, knowingly harbors or protects the enemy, gives intelligence to the enemy, provides military education, military training, or tactical advice to the enemy, communicates or corresponds with the enemy, or holds any intercourse with the enemy, directly or indirectly. This is the contact and intelligence provision, and its scope is vast. “Holds any intercourse” covers any form of dealing or interaction with the enemy not authorized by proper authority.
The 2024 amendment (Pub. L. 118-159) added “provides military education, military training, or tactical advice to” as a specific prohibited act. Before this amendment, training the enemy was prosecutable under the general “aids the enemy” language, but Congress chose to make it explicit, likely reflecting concerns about service members providing tactical knowledge to hostile non-state actors.
Who Qualifies as “Enemy”
This question controls the entire article. Without an “enemy,” Article 103b doesn’t apply regardless of how damaging the conduct might be.
Under UCMJ and MCM interpretation, “enemy” includes the armed forces of a nation with which the United States is at war and any hostile body that the armed forces of the United States may be opposing. This second category extends beyond declared wars to cover armed conflicts, hostilities, and engagements with hostile forces even absent a formal declaration. Al-Qaeda operatives during operations in Afghanistan constitute “the enemy” under Article 103b, even though Congress authorized military force (AUMF) rather than declaring war.
The distinction matters for charging decisions. A service member who passes classified information to a foreign intelligence service that is not an enemy faces Article 103a (Espionage). The same service member passing information to an enemy force faces Article 103b, which carries a simpler element structure and the death penalty without the categorical limitations that restrict capital espionage under Article 103a.
“Without Proper Authority”. The Second Offense’s Key Qualifier
The material assistance offense (first offense) has no “without proper authority” qualifier. Providing arms, ammunition, or supplies to the enemy is prohibited absolutely. No authorization can make it lawful to arm a hostile force.
The contact and intelligence offense (second offense) includes “without proper authority” as a critical qualifier. This acknowledges that some communication with the enemy is authorized and necessary. Surrender negotiations require contact. Prisoner exchanges require contact. Psychological operations may involve communication directed at enemy forces. Civil affairs operations in contested areas may involve interaction with individuals who could be characterized as part of a hostile body.
“Proper authority” must come from the military chain of command, a commander authorizing specific contact for a specific operational purpose. Self-authorized contact, no matter how well-intentioned, violates Article 103b if it involves the enemy. A service member who independently contacts enemy combatants to negotiate a local ceasefire, believing it will save lives, has committed the offense unless properly authorized. Intent to help doesn’t substitute for authorization.
The Intent Boundary: Directed Aid vs. Incidental Access
A critical legal distinction under Article 103b is the difference between directing assistance to the enemy and making information accessible to the enemy as a consequence of broader disclosure. In United States v. Manning (2013), the military judge acquitted the accused of aiding the enemy while convicting on other charges, because the prosecution could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had actual knowledge that classified information transmitted to a third party would reach enemy hands.
The case established a boundary that remains operative: Article 103b requires the assistance to be directed toward the enemy. A service member who deliberately transmits intelligence to an enemy commander violates Article 103b. A service member who discloses classified information through other channels, knowing the enemy could potentially access it, faces espionage charges under Article 103a but not necessarily Article 103b, unless the prosecution can prove the accused specifically intended or knew the information would reach enemy hands.
The distinction between directed aid and incidental access determines whether a disclosure falls under Article 103b’s wartime penalty structure or under other provisions with different elements and different intent requirements. The boundary is narrow, but it exists, and the charging decision often turns on which side of it the evidence falls.
Joseph L. Jordan, Attorney at Law: Article 103b is the UCMJ’s broadest loyalty offense, criminalizing any form of material, logistical, or communicative assistance to an enemy. The FY2025 NDAA expanded the statute to cover cyber-enabled assistance and digital intelligence transfers. The maximum punishment is death.
This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. No attorney-client relationship is created by reading this content. If you are facing charges under the UCMJ or need legal guidance regarding military justice matters, consult a qualified military defense attorney.