This article is part of a comprehensive series covering the punitive articles of the UCMJ (Uniform Code of Military Justice). It is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Service members facing any UCMJ charge should consult a qualified military defense attorney.
One year of confinement for a contemptuous remark. Death for a physical attack in wartime. Both offenses live inside Article 89 of the UCMJ (10 U.S.C. § 889), sharing a single statutory address but separated by the widest penalty gap in the code’s insubordination framework. Subsection (a) criminalizes disrespect: words, gestures, omissions that detract from the respect owed to a superior commissioned officer. Subsection (b) criminalizes assault: striking, drawing a weapon against, or offering violence to a superior commissioned officer in the execution of their office.
Before the Military Justice Act of 2016, Article 89 covered only disrespect. The MJA reorganized the punitive articles, moving the assault-of-superior-officer offense from its previous location into Article 89 as a new subsection (b), effective January 1, 2019. The result is a statute that encompasses both ends of the insubordination spectrum: from the contemptuous remark to the physical attack. Both threaten the chain of command, but in fundamentally different ways and at fundamentally different scales.
What Disrespect Means Under Article 89(a)
The MCM defines disrespect as behavior that detracts from the respect due to the authority and person of a superior commissioned officer. That definition is intentionally broad. Disrespect can be verbal, abusive epithets, contemptuous language, denunciatory remarks. It can be physical, neglecting the customary salute with marked disdain, turning away from an officer mid-conversation, displaying deliberate indifference or insolence. It can even be an omission, a failure to act where military custom and regulation require acknowledgment of the officer’s authority. The MCM 2024 (Part IV, Paragraph 14) breaks Article 89 into two offense categories, each with distinct elements and penalty structures.
Two points separate Article 89 disrespect from ordinary civilian rudeness.
First, under the MCM’s framework, truth is not a defense. A service member who tells a superior officer something factually accurate. “you don’t know what you’re doing,” for instance, can still be convicted if the manner and context of the statement are disrespectful. The offense is not about the content of the communication but its effect on the authority structure. This is a significant departure from civilian speech norms, where truthfulness often mitigates or eliminates liability.
Second, the officer’s presence is not required. Disrespectful statements made about a superior officer to other service members, in a barracks conversation, at a training event, on social media, can constitute a violation even though the officer never heard them directly. The MCM does note that purely private conversations should not ordinarily be charged, but “ordinarily” is guidance, not a prohibition. A commander retains discretion to charge disrespect uttered in ostensibly private settings if the circumstances warrant it, particularly if the statements were heard by subordinates and undermined the officer’s authority.
Who Qualifies as “Superior”
The “superior commissioned officer” requirement has precise boundaries. The officer must be commissioned, second lieutenant or ensign and above. Warrant officers and noncommissioned officers are protected by a different provision, Article 91. The officer must also be superior to the accused, which can mean superior in rank, superior in command, or both.
The statute distinguishes between superiority in command and superiority in rank because the punishment differs. Disrespect toward an officer superior in command carries up to one year of confinement and a bad-conduct discharge. Disrespect toward an officer superior only in rank carries up to six months and a bad-conduct discharge. The logic is that an officer in the accused’s chain of command exercises direct authority over them, so disrespect does more immediate damage to discipline than disrespect toward an officer who merely holds a higher grade.
A complication arises in joint environments. A Marine lance corporal working alongside an Army captain may not immediately recognize the captain’s rank insignia or may not consider the captain part of their chain of command. The prosecution must prove the accused knew the person was a superior commissioned officer. Actual knowledge is required, not that the accused should have known, but that they did know. In joint, inter-service, or coalition settings, this element can become the most contested issue at trial.
The Assault Subsection and Its Wartime Escalation
Article 89(b) criminalizes three specific acts against a superior commissioned officer in the execution of their office: striking the officer (any intentional offensive touching, however slight), drawing or lifting a weapon against the officer (loaded or not, firearm or otherwise), and offering any violence (attempted physical harm beyond a mere verbal threat).
The “in the execution of the officer’s office” qualifier is a threshold element. If the officer was not acting in their official capacity at the time, if the encounter was purely personal and unrelated to military duties, the assault may be charged under the general assault provision (Article 128) rather than Article 89(b). The distinction matters because Article 89(b) carries dramatically harsher punishment, particularly the wartime death penalty provision.
In peacetime, assault of a superior commissioned officer under Article 89(b) carries a maximum of dishonorable discharge, total forfeiture, and ten years’ confinement. In wartime, the maximum is death. This is one of a handful of UCMJ provisions that retain the death penalty, reflecting the military’s judgment that physical violence against the officer corps during wartime threatens combat effectiveness at the most fundamental level.
The Divestiture Defense
The most significant defense unique to Article 89 is divestiture. If the superior officer’s own conduct constituted a substantial departure from the standards required by military custom and regulation, that officer may be deemed to have divested themselves of the protection Article 89 provides.
Divestiture does not require that the officer committed a crime. It requires that the officer’s behavior was so far outside the bounds of expected conduct that a reasonable person would conclude the officer had abandoned the dignity and authority of their position. An officer who initiates a physical altercation with a subordinate, who uses racial slurs, or who engages in conduct so far below the standards of the officer corps that their authority is fundamentally compromised may have divested themselves of Article 89 protection.
This defense is narrow by design. The military does not want subordinates deciding for themselves when an officer deserves respect and when they do not, that calculation would destroy the chain of command. But it recognizes that an officer who grossly violates the standards they are supposed to embody has weakened the premise on which their protected status rests. The factual question is whether the officer’s misconduct was serious enough to cross the line from ordinary human imperfection to fundamental departure from duty.
How Article 89 Connects to the Broader Authority Framework
Article 89 occupies a specific position in a network of provisions that protect military authority at different levels and from different threats.
Article 88 protects specific civilian officials from contemptuous words by commissioned officers. Article 89 protects superior commissioned officers from disrespect by anyone subject to the UCMJ. Article 90 criminalizes willfully disobeying a lawful command from a superior commissioned officer. Article 91 extends similar protection to warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and petty officers against insubordinate conduct. Article 92 criminalizes failure to obey orders or regulations generally.
Overlap is common on a single set of facts. A service member who disobeys an order while hurling insults at the officer who gave it may violate both Article 89 (disrespect) and Article 90 (willful disobedience). A service member who obeys the order but does so with obvious contempt, slamming equipment, muttering insults loud enough for others to hear, may violate Article 89 without violating Article 90. Analytically, the offenses remain distinct even when they arise from the same incident, because each protects a different interest: Article 89 protects the officer’s authority and dignity, while Article 90 protects the enforceability of lawful commands.
The pattern across Articles 88 through 92 is a graduated system. It starts with speech offenses (Art. 88, contempt toward civilian officials; Art. 89(a), disrespect toward superior officers), escalates through physical conduct offenses (Art. 89(b), assault on superior officer), and extends into disobedience offenses (Art. 90, willful disobedience; Art. 91, insubordinate conduct; Art. 92, failure to obey). The graduation is not accidental. A system that treated verbal disrespect and physical assault identically would lose the ability to signal which behaviors represent escalating threats, and a subordinate who crosses one line would have no structural reason not to cross the next.
Joseph L. Jordan, Attorney at Law: Article 89 covers two offenses: disrespect toward a superior commissioned officer and assault upon a superior commissioned officer in the execution of office. The MJA 2016 moved the assault provision into this article as subsection (b), with wartime assault carrying a potential death sentence.
This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. No attorney-client relationship is created by reading this content. If you are facing charges under the UCMJ or need legal guidance regarding military justice matters, consult a qualified military defense attorney.